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INTERPRETING THE RESURRECTION
by T H E R E V . D R DAVID F E R G U S S O N
'O God, who by the resurrection of your Son Jesus Christ from the
dead delivered us from the power of darkness and brought us into
the kingdom of your love: grant that as by his death he has
recalled us to life, so by his presence ever abiding in us he may
raise us to joys eternal."
THE language of Christian prayer reflects two central components ofchristology. One is the exclusive importance attached to a brief
portion of history centring upon the death ofjesus, while the other is
the assertion of his continuing presence to the believer. The ways in
which these twin themes are articulated is nowhere more apparent
than in the theology of the resurrection. In this respect the resurrection
provides the most important case-study in Christian interpretation.
The sense in which the history ofjesus is theologically significant and
the sense in which he can be spoken of as present — these are partly
illustrated and partly constituted by the interpretation of the
resurrection.
What do we mean when we say that 'Jesus is risen'? For the sake of a
coherent christology this question surely requires careful consideration
yet in much of the literature it tends to be neglected or treated
ambivalently. In what follows I shall attempt to outline the shape of
three rival interpretations of the resurrection which lie at various
stages on a possible spectrum of positions. I shall label them, for
convenience' sake, radical, liberal and traditional. Each represents a
constructive theological proposal and thus attempts to present an
adequate interpretation of the NT understanding(s) of Jesus'
resurrection. This claim to Christian adequacy provides an important
criterion for assessing the merits of each position.
The rival interpretations can be clarified by posing the question: Is
the resurrection an event in the life ofjesus or an event in the life of the
believer? If it is the former, then the resurrection happens to Jesus
independently of ourselves and is discovered to be the case. If it is the
latter then it is created within or realised by the believer. The truth
conditions attached to the assertion 'Jesus is risen' will vary according
1
 .\rew Every Morning (BBC, London, 1983), p. 35.
287
288 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
to which of these two options are preferred, and this in turn will
determine the extent of one's christological realism.2
The radical interpretation
This position is represented by Bultmann, Marxsen and others.3
Despite the fact that his writings contain little on the resurrection
Bultmann's position is clear and follows inexorably from his stand on a
number of related matters — the concept of miracle, our knowledge of
God, the relationship between faith and history, and the application of
historical criticism to the NT. In one place he clearly identifies belief in
the resurrection with belief in the saving efficacy of the Cross — to
confess that 'Jesus is risen' is essentially to realise that the Cross has
been taken up into one's life and has become a reality of faith.* In a
famous sentence he speaks of Jesus as rising into the kerygma.
If the event of Easter Day is in any sense a historical event
additional to the event of the cross, it is nothing else than the rise
of faith in the risen Lord.5
From this remark it is apparent that the resurrection is not an event
which belongs to the history of Jesus. The surface appearance of the
gospel narrative is quite misleading. The history of Jesus culminates in
his crucifixion, so that this is really the only significant thing that
happens to him; the subsequent history of the NT period concerns the
early church. The resurrection, therefore, belongs not so much to the
history of Jesus as to that of the Christian faith.
There seem to me to be three types of consideration which typically
motivate the radical position.
(i) The first is a hostility towards any notion of the miraculous. The
idea of a divine intervention into the causal nexus of our space-time
2
 In the context of a discussion of the resurrection Donald MacKinnon has drawn
attention to the significance of the dispute between realism and idealism for theology.
The Resurrection: A Dialogue, Lampe and MacKinnon, (Mowbray, London, 1966), p.
11 off.
1
 Rudolf Bultmann, 'The New Testament and Mythology' in Kerygma and Mylh I, cd.
Bartsch (SPCK, London, 1953), Willi Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth
(SCM, London, 1970); cf. John Knox, The Death of Christ (Collins, London, 1970),
Appendix; Norman Perrin, The Resurrection Narratives: A New Approach (SCM, London,
1977), passim; Schubert Ogden, Christ Without Myth (Collins, London, 1962), Chapter
IV; David Tracy, Blessed Rage For Order (Seabury Press, New York, 1975), p. 220.
4
 'Faith in the resurrection is really the same thing as faith in the saving efficacy of the
cross': op. cit., p. 41.
5
 ibid., p. 42. For a good exegesis of Bultmann's position on the resurrection sec
Ogden, op. cit., pp. 83-8.
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world cannot be philosophically sustained. The hypothesis of a
supernatural agent, employed to explain certain phenomena, is now
redundant and discredited. It can never be reasonable to postulate an
act of God as the cause of an otherwise inexplicable phenomenon. This
hostility towards the miraculous also has a positive theological
dimension. The idea of an interventionist God who occasionally
breaches the natural order is problematic. Such a God would be
haphazard and inscrutable, and we would be left with the impossible
conundrum of why he should intervene in one situation but not in
another. If intervention is a possibility, occasionally actualised, it
becomes increasingly hard to speculate why it is conspicuously absent
at some of the most critical moments in history. A less arbitrary and
inscrutable God would impose total abstinence upon himself in this
respect, and impart his presence in more constant and indirect ways.6
This is consonant with Bultmann's insistence that the reality of God
cannot be read off from any 'objective' events in history, and leads into
the second motivation governing the radical interpretation.
(2) There is no internal relationship between faith and history by
which historical judgments could verify the truth claims of the
Christian faith. In the same way as faith can never be established upon
facts about the natural world, so it can never be based upon a survey of
'objective' historical events.7 For Bultmann faith cannot be grounded
in any historical probability that Jesus said this or did that, and,
a fortiori, the resurrection cannot be assimilated to reports about an
empty tomb or a set of appearances. As such it would be reduced to a
proof-miracle and would pre-empt the need for an existential decision
in response to God's word.
Given this theological aversion to 'objective' history, it is essential
that the resurrection belongs to the life of the believer. The radical
separation of faith and history leads to the location of the former in the
interior of the existential self. As an event disclosing the significance of
Jesus' death the resurrection is co-extensive with the rise of faith in the
6
 That this is a consideration which held sway with Bultmann is brought out by Hans
Jonas in his essay 'Is Faith Still Possible: Memories of Rudolf Bultmann and Reflections
on the Philosophical Aspects of His Work', Harvard Theological Review, 1982, p. 18.
7
 Bultmann's polemic against objectivising modes of thought provides, I believe, the
key to his entire system. It is derived from Herrmann's relationalism in which faith arises
out of a pre-cognitive state of the self in relation to God. Both Herrmann and Bultmann
are implacably opposed to any suggestion that faith is grounded in the assent of the
intellect to propositional knowledge. This provides the setting for Bultmann's treatment
of the faith-history problem and even pervades his exegesis.
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believer. It refers to the function of the Cross in bringing him into a
radically new relationship with God.
(3) The third motivation behind the radical interpretation
concerns the application of historical criticism to the NT. It is argued
that the sort of evidence required to reconstruct an historically
authentic outline of the empty tomb narratives and the appearance
stories is simply not available and that this merely underlines how far it
is from the intention of the writers to supply us with empirical evidence
for Christian belief.8
The radical interpretation can point out that in the resurrection
narratives the gospels do not reflect eye-witness accounts of historical
events. At Mark 16 within the space of eight verses there are several
considerations which count against the historicity of the narrative.
The motive of the women in going to the tomb is problematic. It is
unclear why they would anoint a body, two days dead in the
Palestinian climate, which had already been dressed and entombed.
And would not the sudden thought that they require someone to move
the stone have occurred to them beforehand and not just on arrival at
the tomb? Moreover, the apperance and message of the angel give a
presumption in favour of the view that here we are dealing with
mythological and legendary traits. And finally, the concluding words
of the gospel (if the gospel is understood to have ended at v. 8) can
hardly be taken literally. If the women had indeed kept silent, neither
the disciples nor the evangelist would have known of what had
happened. We seem to be dealing here with the expression of some
apologetic or theological intention and not with a straightforward
concern to report the historical details.
This trend is strengthened by an analysis of the parallels. Matthew
28.1-15 represents a considerable development of the empty tomb
narrative which is best explained by his apologetic concern to refute
the Jewish polemic that the disciples stole the body. Luke's departures
from the Marcan text might be explicable in terms of his own special
interest in locating the Easter events in and around Jerusalem. Thus
the angel's forecast of an appearance in Galilee is transmuted into a
reminiscence of Jesus' words while still in Galilee and the omission of
Salome in favour of Joanna can be explained by the previous mention
of Joanna at 8.3. John's empty tomb narrative reveals similarities and
differences from the synoptics which suggest that his material is, in
* Many recent treatments of the resurrection begin with a careful examination of ihe
historical background to the sources, e.g. Schillebeeckx's Jesus (Collins, London, 1979).
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some measure, independent.9 And the way in which it is integrated
with the specific concerns of the Fourth Gospel merely underlines the
fluidity of the tradition and the impossibility of setting the narratives
side by side in order to recreate an authentic sequence of events.
Similar conclusions are drawn, mutatis mutandis, with regard to the
appearance stories. The narrative of Matthew 28.16-20 displays dis-
tinctively Matthean words and themes10 and the words of com-
mission seem to belong to a relatively late stage in the history of the
tradition with the reference to the Gentile mission, the triadic formula,
and the receding of the Parousia into the distant future. The narrative
of Luke 24.36fT. is framed in terms of the specifically Lukan theology.
The resurrection period is a transitional phase which looks forward to
the Ascension, Pentecost and the beginning of the church's history."
The appearance to the disciples at John 20.19-23 provides a dramatic
contrast to Luke's scheme. The cross has already been highlighted as
Jesus' supreme moment of exaltation and in resonance with this we
find that the events of resurrection, the coming of the spirit, and
ascension have been compressed into a period of about twenty-four
hours. Bultmann shows very elegantly how the Evangelist makes use
of the sequence of events in Chapter 20 to highlight his central
concerns.12
All these considerations advanced by the radical interpretation lend
weight to the argument that the Easter narratives should be seen not as
attempts to verify faith on the basis of historical evidence but as
expressions or explorations of what faith involves. We might then say
that the narratives represent the symptoms rather than the causes of
Christian faith.
In this manner historical criticism can lend itself to a quasi-idealist
treatment of the resurrection. Its primary denotation is not an
objective mind-independent act of God upon the dead Jesus but the
coming into being of a new faith. The 'eschatological' existence of the
believer is not the correlate of Jesus' resurrection but is actually to be
identified with it. To describe this account as idealist, however, is not
to suggest that the resurrection is the subjective creation of the human
* cf. R. H. Fuller, The Formation Of The Resurrection Narratives (SPCK, London, 1972),
pp. 13 iff.
10
 cf. ihe essay by G. Barth in Tradition And Interpretation In Matthew, cd. Bornkamm,
Barth and Held (SCM, London, 1963), pp. 131-7.
" 'Luke's resurrection is not an end in itself but a point of transition.' C. F. Evans,
Resurrection And The New Testament (SCM, London, 1970), p. 96.
1J
 The Gospel oj John (Blackwell, Oxford, 1971), pp. 68lff.
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subject. For all its ideal character in Bultmann, it is no less a gift of
God, an imparting of the divine grace. The idealism is reflected in the
fact that God's gift of resurrection has a dispositional rather than an
antecedently objective character. It is as if the reality of the
resurrection is only brought into being by the rise of faith, yet what is
created is of God's making rather than our own.
Yet there are other textual considerations which militate against the
radical interpretation. At i Cor. 15, Paul seems to do exactly what
Bultmann says he should not be doing. He refers his readers back to a
received tradition which has been passed down to him and which is
among the things of first importance for the preaching of the gospel.
This tradition specifies in a series of formulae the bare fact of the
appearances of Jesus to various individuals and groups.13 In the
preamble to the formula at verses 1-2, rather than introducing an
incautious argumenlum ad hominem, Paul lays careful and delib-
erate stress on the tradition. There are several reasons for treating it as
trustworthy. Its formal and stylised structure suggests a tradition that
has been carefully preserved. Its primary importance for the preaching
of the gospel indicates both that Paul must have received it early on in
his apostolic career, if not in Damascus then perhaps in Jerusalem, and
also that it could hardly have been other than a major topic in any
conversations he had with Peter. Thus Paul would have been familiar
with a formula whose origin is likely to have been within only a few
years of the events depicted.14
The events to which he refers are those of crucifixion, burial,
resurrection and appearance, and the logic of the formula at verses
3b-4 indicates that the resurrection is conceived of as an event in
the personal destiny of Jesus which made possible his subsequent
appearances to Peter and the others. There is a complete continuity of
identity through death, burial, resurrection and appearance. The
language suggests that Jesus' significance for faith is a consequence of
his being personally raised from the dead. Its reference is to an event in
13
 According to his method of Sachkritik Bultmann concludes that Paul in the moment
of polemic departs from his main intention, Faith And Understanding (SCM, London,
>969). PP- 83"4-
14
 C. H. Dodd has written: 'No statement could be more emphatic or unambiguous.
In making it Paul is exposing himself to the criticism of resolute opponents, who would
have been ready to point to any flaw in his credentials or in his presentation of the
common tradition.' 'The Appearances Of The Risen Christ: An Essay In Form
Criticism Of The Gospels' in Studies In The Gospels, ed. Nineham (Blackwell, Oxford,
1957), p. 28.
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the destiny of Jesus which makes possible his subsequent appearance
for faith. The resurrection is here construed as the condition of the rise
of faith rather than being assimilated to the latter.
This criticism of the radical interpretation is reinforced by ob-
serving the way in which the name Jesus' functions in the kerygma. In
denoting an active subject the kerygma presupposes the resurrection as
an event in the destiny of Jesus. He remains an individual who exists
independently and extra nos. Hence the resurrection must refer not to
the rise of faith in the believer but to the enduring personal identity of
Jesus. The risen Christ who acts as the agent of salvation is more than a
reminiscence of the crucified Jesus which quickens new faith within the
believer.
These observations show that much of the NT witness points away
from the radical interpretation. In the light of this it is worth assess-
ing it in terms of its second characteristic motivation — the funda-
mental cleavage between faith and history. The lack of any internal
relationship between faith and the empirical world is acutely present
in Bultmann's theology of the resurrection. The evidence of an empty
tomb or a set of appearances cannot verify the claims of the kerygma.
Yet it is worth asking whether the situation is construed in terms of a
false set of alternatives. That the appearances cannot function as a
proof-miracle that Jesus is the exalted Son of God whose presence
imparts new life, does not entail that they are wholly irrelevant. They
could function as necessary rather than sufficient conditions for faith.
And if they were insufficient but necessary conditions they would not
pose the same threat to existential commitment.
For Bultmann the empirical antecedents of the Easter faith are a
matter only of historical conjecture; from a theological point of view
they are quite irrelevant. The signs of God's action are manifested only
in the existential life of the believer rather than in the empirical world.
The only miracle is the miracle of faith and by affirming the irrelevance
of the empirical we bring this into sharper focus. This assertion that the
true miracle is the miracle of faith has a profound attraction. In its
exclusive emphasis upon the moment of belief it has a certain purity of
insight. There is nothing spare or surfeit that can distract our attention
or indulge our sentiments. The gospel can only be attested existentially
and not by framing hypotheses about the obscure historical
circumstances lying behind 1 Cor. 15 or the gospel narratives. Yet for
all its simplicity and force the position is in danger of becoming an
empty formalism.
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A coherent account of how the Christian faith arose is a matter of
theological importance. Any attempt to explain and justify a belief
cannot ignore the causal conditions which gave rise to it. To say that
the new faith of the disciples was the consequence of God's power
kindled within them after the crucifixion is not only to make a
theological proposal but is also to commit oneself to a historical
explanation. It implies that the appearance stories and the empty
tomb narratives are inessential both for elucidating the content of
Christian faith and for explaining how that faith took a specific form.
Yet this negative judgment raises certain questions. Why should the
kerygma always and everywhere have proclaimed the personal
resurrection as prior to the rise of faith in his followers? And why should
the formula of i Cor. 15 have assumed theological importance for Paul
who is otherwise uninterested in the tradition concerning the earthly
Jesus?
Willi Marxsen's The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth provides a
response to these questions while still remaining within the radical
position. Central to his thesis is the conviction that the activity of
Jesus of Nazareth goes on after his death in the lives of his followers. It
is to this that the gospel writers testify and the only relevant evidence
is the existence of Christian faith.15 The resurrection stories are
imaginative ways of expressing Christian faith while the list recited by
Paul points to the status of the original believers who occupy a special
role in the early community. Yet there is a crucial ambivalence in
Marxsen's presentation which makes his theological proposals highly
elusive. The dictum that 'the activity of Jesus goes on' can be
interpreted in either a weak or a strong sense. It can mean that the
activity which Jesus had initiated is taken up and continued by his
disciples, or it can mean that Jesus remains an active subject who
continues to impart his presence. Marxsen's account trades on this
ambivalence. If we opt for the weak sense of the expression then clearly
all that is required for the resurrection is the existence of faith. If we opt
for the strong sense we seem to imply a personal resurrection of Jesus.
Both weak and strong senses possess their respective advantages and
disadvantages. The advantage of the weak interpretation is its
simplicity both historically and theologically. Its disadvantage is that
it does not express both what the gospel narratives seem to be saying
13
 'The evangelists want to show that the activity ofjesus goes on. It goes on in spite of
his death on the cross; and it remains the activity of the same Jesus who was once active
on earth', op. cit., p. 77.
INTERPRETING THE RESURRECTION 295
and the way in which the Christian tradition has interpreted their
relevance for faith. On the other hand the disadvantage of the strong
interpretation is the epistemological problem of what would justify
statements about the enduring identity of Jesus if we adopt a negative
attitude towards the historicity of the narratives. Its advantage is that
it offers a more full-blooded interpretation of the kerygma. It seems to
me that Marxsen's account equivocates between the two positions
without resolving the problems of either.
Marxsen suggests that the disciples felt themselves called to a new
faith similar to that practised by the earthly Jesus. This, in turn, gave
rise to the proclamation that 'Christ is risen'.16 Yet this proposal still
leaves a twofold problem for the radical position. By reflection upon
the message, example or self-understanding of Jesus one might be
drawn into a deeper religious faith but it is not clear why this should be
expressed in the form 'Jesiis is calling me to faith and has therefore risen
from the dead'. Why should faith take the primitive form of confessing
'Christ is risen' if this is only an inference from faith? And, secondly,
why should the NT reverse the logical order and call upon people to
believe because Christ is risen rather than conclude that Christ is risen
because people continue to believe in Jesus after his death? This point
is brought into focus by Schillebeeckx's criticism of Marxsen.
If the exegetes and theologians who start from the death of Jesus
as the point of disjunction .. . want to convince me, in this regard,
they must first show me why, when John the Baptist had been
beheaded, his movement was able simply to continue on Jewish
ground — as if that death entailed no break at all.17
The criticism of the radical interpretation as represented by
Marxsen is that it neither explains how faith arose nor, more
importantly, why it took the peculiar form it did. Insofar as the
resurrection refers to the continuing identity ofjesus it is not possible to
treat it simply as an event in the believer's life. Yet if its primary
reference is to an event in the destiny ofjesus it becomes difficult to see
what would justify this. Even a divinely inspired reflection upon the
significance of his death does not constitute a sufficient explanation for
a belief in his enduring identity, presence and activity.
At this point we could opt for an economy version of the radical
interpretation by dispensing with any notion of the continuing activity
ofjesus and of a unique action of God either upon Jesus or the believer.
" ibid., p. 128. " Jesus, p. 393.
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The resurrection could then be recast as a symbol which speaks of the
significance of Jesus' life and death. He represents an authentic human
existence and to believe in his resurrection is to allow this paradigm to
regulate one's own existence.18 The theology of the resurrection would
then be freed from any obscure metaphysics, historical difficulties and
allegations of Christian imperialism. Indeed the concept of resur-
rection could virtually be eliminated from this description of the
Christian faith.
The economy of this interpretation has much to commend it, yet
it has drastic consequences for the twin components of christology
mentioned at the outset. Of these components one is removed while the
other is placed in jeopardy. The presence of Jesus to the believer is now
only an elliptical way of speaking of the functional value of his life and
death. And this in turn raises a query about attaching a unique and
exclusive importance to one brief portion of history. Why not allow
other models of human existence a similar instrumental value instead
of placing all the emphasis upon this one segment of history? If we wish
to retain these twin components of christology we could consider
whether a liberal interpretation of the resurrection fares better than
the radical one.
The liberal interpretation
The liberal interpretation is represented by Schillebeeckx, Kiing,
Lampe, Mackey and others." Its characteristics include a dis-
satisfaction with the radical view, an emphasis upon the appearance
stories as explanation, a historical scepticism about the empty tomb,
and an uneasiness about any notion of the miraculous.
Schillebeeckx's account centres upon the notion of explanation.
The interpretation of the resurrection must satisfy the criterion of
rendering the disciples' faith intelligible. Since the concept of
explanation is central to the task of interpretation it is worth asking
what is implied by it.
There is a style of conservative apologetic which argues from the
existence of the disciples' faith to the miracle of the resurrection. The
truth of the resurrection is demonstrated by the existence of faith since
it is the only available adequate explanation. Unless we presuppose the
18
 This is the position that arises out of Ogden's revision of Bulimann.
" Schillebeeckx, Jesus; Hans Kiing, On Being A Christian (Collins, London, 1974);
Lampe and Mackinnon, The Resurrection: A Dialogue;James Mackey, Jesus: The Man And
The Myth (SCM, London, 1979).
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miracle we cannot account for the rise of faith. Thus described, this line
of reasoning is fallacious for reasons of a Humean sort. It attempts
to explain the occurrence of one improbable event by postulating
another event which is even more improbable. On inductive gounds
the resurrection of a dead person is intrinsically highly improbable, and
therefore it can never be rational to postulate such an event as the
explanation of a phenomenon which although remarkable is not so
improbable as the resurrection. This crude piece of apologetic will
always be vulnerable to Hume's criticism concerning the mutual
destruction of arguments.20
Yet while this is a fallacious argument it does not entail that the
notion of explanation is wholly irrelevant in the theology of the
resurrection. If we have two rival theories one of which can explain
what the other leaves unexplained, then, ceteris paribus, the former is
to be preferred. And since the interpretation of the resurrection
includes both historical and theological factors the ability to explain
will be among the criteria of adequacy. Any alternative to the radical
view must be historically plausible and theologically constructive and
these are the two desiderata that Schillebeeckx sets himself.21
He argues that the stimulus to faith was a set of resurrection visions
disclosing the continuing activity of Jesus. These events lie behind the
record of the appearances and fill the hiatus between the death of Jesus
and the rise of faith. From out of these experiences arises the conviction
that Jesus is risen from the dead and is now present to the believer. Yet
if we ask the question posed earlier, 'Is the resurrection an event in the
life of Jesus or an event in the life of the believer?', I am not clear what
Schillebeeckx's answer should be. The way in which he interprets the
narratives suggests that they refer primarily to the religious
experiences of the disciples. They are experiences of divine grace and
forgiveness which are expressed by saying that Jesus must be alive and
present. On the other hand, his language about 'renewed fellowship'
with Jesus seems to imply that the resurrection is an event in the
personal destiny of Jesus. The juxtaposition of the following two
passages brings this out.
May it not be that Simon Peter — and indeed the Twelve —
arrived via their concrete experience of forgiveness after Jesus'
death, encountered as grace and discussed among themselves (as
20
 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed . Se lby-Bigge ( T h i r d E d i t i o n ,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975), Section X, 'Miracles', p. 116.
21
 op.cit., p. 380.
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they remembered Jesus' sayings about, among other things, the
gracious God) as the 'evidence for belief: the Lord is alive? . . . It
is the individual's experience of new being that imparts to faith
the assurance that Jesus is alive or is the coming judge of the
world.22
In other words, spiritual contact with Jesus, ruptured by death,
has been restored: they can once more address each other in
intimate, personal terms, death notwithstanding. Death has not
shattered living communication with Jesus: that is, he continues
after his death to offer those who are his a fellowship belonging to
and constituting life. In this fellowship believers experience Jesus
as brought back from the the realm of the dead, that is, as the One
who lives or as the One who has risen again. After his death,
intercourse, conversation, with him continues — in a very
personal sense.23
An attempt is thus made to explain the disciples visions by
assimilating them to a more general category of decisive religious
experience. Yet how exactly could an experience of the divine grace be
identical with renewed spiritual fellowship with a dead person? If it is
said that the resurrection is an inference from the experience (s), or is an
interpretation of it, then the question arises as to what justifies the
inference. To speak of a religious experience of grace and forgiveness as
a personal encounter with a dead person seems either to be an elliptical
way of speaking or else an extravagent use of rhetoric. In this respect
Schillebeeckx fails to satisfy the two criteria he sets down. He cannot
explain why the Christian faith should speak in irreducible terms
about a personal resurrection of Jesus nor how the disciples came to
believe in this.24
Similar difficulties attend other versions of the liberal interpretation.
Hans Kiing postulates the conversion experiences of the disciples to
explain the rise of the resurrection faith.25 Yet the form and content he
ascribes to these experiences undermine their function as explanations
of that faith. It is a striking feature of his account that while he wants to
22
 ib id . , p . 3 9 1 .
25
 i b i d , p . 345 .
24
 A possible response might be to argue that given those experiences of the disciples,
what explains their issuing in the resurrection faith is their conjunction with prevailing
categories and beliefs. Yet this runs into the difficulty that the apocalyptic idea of the
resurrection of the Last Day as something that could occur in advance for one person had
no precedent injewish thought. Schillebeeckx makes this point himself (ibid, p. 395-6).
25
 op. cit, p. 352.
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stress the discontinuity of Jesus' resurrection with other prevailing
ideas of resurrection, those experiences which are supposed to explain
this discontinuity are construed in terms quite continuous with other
vocational, conversion and faith-motivating experiences. There is, on
the one hand, a desire to affirm something that is radically unique and
without parallel and, on the other, a desire to make what justifies that
affirmation more plausible by reducing it to an instance of a general
pattern. Insofar as the appearance stories become visions belonging to
a general category they cannot do the work that Kiing requires of
them.
The fundamental ambivalence of the liberal interpretation can be
seen in James Mackey's elegant presentation of it.26 His answer to the
question of whether the resurrection is an event in the destiny of
Jesus or in the believer seems to be 'both'. This is achieved, I think,
by the conflation of the occurrence of the event in itself with the
implications and consequences that the event has. This enables him to
speak of the resurrection as an event for Jesus himself while insisting
that its principal meaning is the existential significance of the life and
death ofjesus. It is illustrated in his tabulation of the dominant themes
in Paul's understanding of the resurrection.27 The series of verbs that
he employs enables this conflation to be made. Thus: (1) the phrase
'the resurrection of Jesus' is aligned with Paul's vocational experience;
(2) the conviction of Jesus' resurrection coincides with a sense of new
power and life; (3) the resurrection means that we also can hope to be
raised; (4) the resurrection ofjesus implies that Jesus can be expected to
return. Finally, he notes that 'the most frequently recurring theme' is
the personal resurrection ofjesus himself. Yet it is surely the case that if
we analyse the sense and reference of the phrase 'the resurrection of
Jesus' we are seen to be talking primarily about an event in the destiny
ofjesus prior to any implications it may have for vocation, a sense of
new life, and a hope in our own eventual resurrection. This is not one
theme amongst others but is the condition and explanation upon
which all these others are based.
This conflation is reflected in a further ambivalence surrounding
Mackey's central notion ofjesus as spirit.
He (Paul) understands by the resurrection ofjesus primarily the
Christian experience ofjesus as Spirit or Lord in the lives of his
followers.28
" op. cit., Chapter Three. " ibid., pp. iooff. 2* ibid., p. 97.
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It is not clear whether this is the consequence or the meaning itself of
Jesus' resurrection. Correlated with this is the difficulty of assessing
whether the experience of Jesus as spirit is intended in a strong
substantive sense which would require a personal resurrection as its
condition, or in a weak sense which would correspond to a sense of
divine grace created by reflection upon the story ofjesus. It is, I think,
by trading upon this ambivalence that Mackey reaches his conclusion
which he sees as both an adequate interpretation of the NT and a
constructive theological proposal.
The central and principal element of this resurrection preaching,
I am now saying, is the myth of the death ofjesus. It is the
statement, in the form of narrated symbols, of the deep
significance for human kind of the death of this man.29
If this is the principal element of the resurrection then it is more
accurately described as an event in the life of the believer and the
liberal position collapses back into the radical one. And if we cannot
rest with the liberal position there seem to be two alternatives. Either
we return to the economy version of the radical interpretation or else
we reconsider the possibility of a more traditional interpretation.
The traditional interpretation
In this interpretation the twin claims about the continuing presence
of Jesus and the unique significance of his life and death are sustained
by a stronger theology of the resurrection. The condition for the
presence ofjesus is his continuing identity beyond his death and this
entails that the resurrection is primarily an event for Jesus himself
rather than the believer. Unlike the economy version of the radical
interpretation the resurrection here occupies a constitutive place in
christology.
The resurrection is thus affirmed as an event in the destiny ofjesus.
This is achieved by understanding the empty tomb as a necessary
condition which enables us to make sense of a personal resurrection of
Jesus prior to the rise of faith. As a necessary or negative condition the
empty tomb, in conjunction with some appropriate account of the
appearances, has the function, not so much of verifying faith, as
contributing to its overall shape and balance. We can only make sense
of the claim about the continuing presence and activity ofjesus if the
29
 i b i d . , p . 1 1 7 .
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resurrection is conceived of as an event in his destiny alongside the
crucifixion. Thus Barth writes:
For unless Christ's resurrection was a resurrection of the body, we
have no guarantee that it was the decisively acting Subject Jesus
Himself who rose from the dead.30
And, more recently, Rowan Williams:
Something must have provided a first stimulus, and more
importantly, a structure of presuppositions within which
subsequent experiences could be organised.31
While the empty tomb cannot be a sufficient condition for belief in
the resurrection this does not preclude it from functioning as a negative
and necessary condition.32 As an empirical correlate of the resurrection
it points away from itself while contributing to the overall shape and
structure of the faith. The empty tomb and the appearances thus
provide the matrix within which the event of the resurrection is
grasped and articulated.
The most immediate objection to this is posed by historical criticism
which raises difficulties for any confident judgment about the tomb of
Jesus. But before responding to this objection a preliminary point may
be made. In as much as the empty tomb was once thought to form the
basis of an argument to the resurrection it required the strongest set of
warrants. We have already seen why these warrants are unavailable.
The gospel narratives simply cannot be assimilated to eye-witness
reports about the empty tomb. If, however, the empty tomb is to be
treated neither as a proof-miracle nor as the justification of the
resurrection, but only as a negative condition, it will not be a matter of
acute concern if the historical warrants for it are less conclusive than
they were once thought to be. The most troubling consideration will be
the claim that the narratives have no historical basis whatsoever since
they are to be explained as either legends or myths created by the early
community.
It is sometimes noted that, with the exception of John 20.8, the
10
 Church Dogmatics, III.2 (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1958), p. 448.
31
 Resurrection (Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1982), p. 106.
" To argue that the empty tomb is irrelevant because it cannot verify the resurrection
is a familiar non sequitur. Cf. Kiing: 'the empty tomb alone even in the light of the stories
cannot provide any proof of the resurrection or justify any hope of the resurrection. . . .
Faith in the risen Christ therefore is independent of the empty tomb.' (op. cit., pp. 365-
366).
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discovery of the empty tomb is in itself never the occasion for believ-
ing. Belief is evoked only through the message of the angels or the
appearance of Jesus himself. At Mark 16.5 the empty tomb rather than
causing puzzlement or enabling any inference to the resurrection is
simply the setting for the angelophany." In this sense the resurrection
is already presupposed in the telling of the story. Similarly in Luke the
perplexity of the women is only alleviated by the appearance of the
twin messengers who subtly turn attention away from the tomb by
their question, 'Why do you seek the living among the dead?' In this
manner the empty tomb becomes a symbol for the resurrection
through the resonance of these terse, enigmatic words.
Yet it is not clear what conclusions should be drawn from this. If the
empty tomb is employed as a symbol, and the narratives function as
myth, does this entail that they were originally devised by the
community for that purpose? If a narrative is used as a vehicle for
proclamation, rather than as a straight report of a sequence of events,
does this necessarily entail the absence of a historical core? It could
even be that there is a valid argument running in the opposite
direction, viz., that in order to function adequately as vehicles of
proclamation these narratives must be modelled upon some historical
reminiscence. This would leave room for the possibility that the
narrative is based upon an account of a journey by some women to a
tomb which is found to be empty.
It is also worth noting that Mark and Luke's sensitive treatment of
the empty tomb will tend to disconfirm the hypothesis that it is an
apologetic legend designed to verify the resurrection. Since neither
Mark 16.5 nor Luke 24.3 display any explicit sign of apologetic motive
this counts against the view that they are legendary fabrications.34 If
the Marcan account was created around such a legend one might have
expected certain features to appear which are in fact absent. No
miracle is itself related: there is no marvellous appearance to explain
the tomb's being empty; and no explicit apologetic thrust. The absence
of these features in Mark is highlighted by Matthew's amendments
and additions at a later stage in the tradition which do betray a tend-
ency toward the crudely miraculous and apologetic (as to a greater
degree does the Gospel of Peter). Moreover if the story is an apologetic
33
 This is emphasised by Evans, op. cit., p. 78.
34
 This is well argued by Hans von Campenhausen in 'The Events of Easter and the
Empty Tomb' in Tradition and Life in the Early Church (Collins, London, 1968), pp. 59-
6i,75f-
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legend it is hard to explain why the only witnesses in Mark 16 are
three women who by Jewish law were incompetent to testify.
A further problem about assimilating the narratives to the status of
either legend or myth concerns the state of the disciples' minds. If the
notion of a resurrection from the grave was a more likely option than a
non-corporeal rising for the first-century Jewish mind this will count
against the assumption that the state of Jesus' tomb would have been
irrelevant to the primitive Christians.35 At the very least we have to
reckon with the fact that nowhere in the NT is there any trace of an
attempt to explain the compatibility of the resurrection with an extant
corpse. Indeed the (admittedly late) evidence of Matthew's narrative
suggests that the empty tomb was acknowledged by Jewish opponents.
It may of course have been the case that the disciples had no positive
knowledge of the circumstances ofjesus' burial and the whereabouts of
his grave. This suggestion calls into question the authenticity of the
burial by Joseph at Mark 15.42-8. Yet despite the possibility that this
account is legendary, being designed to soften the ignominy of a
common grave, there is a strong argument to the effect that the
deliberate account of a burial by a notable Jew whose name is
specifically mentioned is likely to be historical.36 If the account of the
burial is authentic it becomes harder to argue that either the disciples
mistakenly thought the tomb was empty or else had no interest in the
matter.37
These considerations show that it is not easy to dismiss the empty
tomb story as either legend or myth. They suggest that the matrix of
Mark 16.1-8, the discovery of an empty tomb by some women, may
have some historical basis. While there is no means of reconstructing a
detailed account of a sequence of events the real possibility that the
tomb was empty is sufficient for a traditional interpretation of the
resurrection. It functions as a negative condition which contributes to
the overall shape and character of the resurrection faith.
15
 For a measured discussion of the concept of resurrection at that time, see Evans, op.
cit., Chapter One.
36
 cf. B u l t m a n n , The History of the Synoptic Tradition (Blackwell, Oxford, 1963), p .
274.
37
 This apologetic thrust should be confined, I think, to combating negative
judgments about the historical core of the narratives. If it is allowed a wider scope it
easily degenerates into a crude argument for the resurrection as 'best explanation' and
thus becomes a distraction from the central christological issues raised by the slory. For a
sensitive exploration of the psychological state of the disciples, see Sebastian Moore's two
articles. 'The Resurrection: A Confusing Paradigm Shift', Downside Review ig8o; 'An
Empty Tomb Revisited', Downside Review igSr.
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In a similar fashion the appearance stories occupy an important
place in the matrix of the faith. Instead of assimilating them to
standard patterns of Christian experience the traditional interpre-
tation locates them in the constitutive framework which makes that
experience possible. This is supported by the context of i Cor. 15.3-11.
The intention of Paul seems to be to adduce evidence upon which faith
is affirmed. These are the indispensable terms on which the gospel is
preached, and if they did not hold it would be falsified.
As with the empty tomb narratives the appearance stories cannot be
reconstructed to resemble eye-witness reports, yet neither can they be
reduced to legendary or mythological creations. Certain apologetic
motifs can be readily discerned in these narratives — a tendency to
verify the resurrection by stressing the corporeality of the risen Jesus
and the authorisation of the church's mission. Yet while these motifs
are present this does not rule out their being constructed around the
bare fact of an appearance ofjesus to his followers, and there is already
a presumption in favour of this in the light of 1 Cor. 15." The emphasis
in the stories (with the exception of Matthew 28.166".) is generally
upon the appearance and recognition of the crucified Jesus. These
manifestations emphasise his humanity whereas had they been
constructed on the model of a miraculous theophany one would have
expected the emphasis to be more on supernatural signs.
For the traditional interpretation the Easter narratives form an
integral part of the story ofjesus. Together with the accounts of his
ministry, passion and death they depict his identity. Even in the
Fourth Gospel the Easter story is narrated with a powerful realism and
emotional vitality. The mere fact of the Evangelist's recording these
stories and integrating them into the climax of the gospel raises the
question as to how indispensable they are for the description of Jesus'
identity. In the traditional interpretation the resurrection is primarily
an event for Jesus rather than the believer. As such it renders his
identity to the believer and enables him or her to know his presence as
the story is understood. And here lies the connexion between the
resurrection and the strong christological claim about the presence of
Jesus. The gospel narrative describes the resurrection as something
38
 There are traces of an initial appearance to Peter at Mark 16.7, Luke 24.34,
the narrative of John 21. Luke, though he knows of an appearance to Peter, has not
taken the liberty of creating a story around this detail. Thus Dodd writes: 'However
ready he may have been to "write up" traditional material which had reached him, and
however great the skill he displays in doing so, he was clearly not willing to create a
whole story out of a bare statement like this' (op. cit., pp. 34-5).
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that happens to Jesus, and, as the risen one, Jesus is able to impart his
presence to the believer. The empirical correlates of the empty tomb
and the appearances provide the space in which this can be grasped.
They are the signs which form an integral part of the story of Jesus'
resurrection, and in understanding who he is in that story he becomes
present. This connexion between the identity of the crucified and risen
Jesus and his presence to the believer is the central theme of Hans Frei's
The Identity of Jesus Christ. He writes:
It is precisely the fiction-like quality of the whole narrative, from
upper room to resurrection appearances, that serves to bring the
identity of Jesus sharply before us and to make him accessible to
us. . . . To know who he is in connection with what took place is to
know that he is. This is the climax of the story and its claim. What
the accounts are saying, in effect, is that the being and identity of
Jesus in the resurrection are such that his nonresurrection
becomes inconceivable."
Hence to ask whether a belief in the resurrection is grounded in
religious experience or in the historical testimony of the gospels is to
pose a false antithesis. To know the presence of Jesus is also to un-
derstand his identity as it is narrated in the story of his life, death and
resurrection. A belief in the gospel story is thus wedded to a sense of
Christ's presence; the shape and content of one's experience is
determined by the nature of the story. Thus the interpretation of the
resurrection is linked to wider considerations in christology.
I have tried to argue that two central components of christology are
tied to the interpretation of the resurrection, and in this latter section I
have tried to show that these can only be sustained in their strong sense
by a more or less traditional interpretation. In this respect such an
interpretation may still have something to commend it. Its most
plausible rival was found to be an economy version of the radical
position which has reductionist implications for christology and
theology generally. If however a stronger form of christological realism
is to be sustained something resembling a traditional understanding of
the resurrection will need to be defended.
" The Identity of Jesus Christ (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1974), p. 145.
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